Network security
Introduction
This session is based on the triad: confidentiality, integrity, availability:
- Confidentiality: prevent from leaking information without permission.
- Integrity: prevent from changing information without permission.
- Availability: make sure the valid users can access information and the system.
Moreover, 2 other security goals:
- Authenticity: ensure data comes from trust and legal source.
- Accountability: store logs, tracking.
Vulnerability, threat, risk
- Vulnerability: the weaknesses of system which
- Threat: new accident (or zero-day) can be harmful for all system or company.
- Risk: can loss or damage when threat exploit vulnerabilities.
Attack and coutermeasure
- Attack is the threat which can lead to unwanted violations of protection confidentiality or the consequences of the threat.
- Active: attempt to change system resources, or work.
- Passive: use information from system without affecting system resources.
- Coutermeasure: prevent or mitigate, recovery effects of attacks.
Some types of attacks
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Unauthorized disclosure:
- Expose.
- Interception.
- Inference.
- Intrusion.
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Deception:
- Masquerade.
- Falsification.
- Repudiation.
-
Disruption:
- Incapacitation.
- Corruption.
- Obstruction.
-
Usurpation:
- Misappropriation.
- Misuse.
Security design principles
- Economy of mechanism: keep the design as simple and small as possible.
- Fail-safe defaults: unless a subject is given explicit access to an object, it should be denied access to that object.
- Complete mediation: requiring access requests to be mediated every time, to avoid authority being circumvented through multiple requests.
- Open design: a system security shouldn’t rely on the secrecy of its implementation.
- Separation of privilege: requires multiple people to approve an action before it can be completed.
- Least privilege: a security architecture should be designed so that each entity is granted the minimum system resources and authorizations.
- Least common mechanism: mechanisms used to access resources should not be shared.
- Psychological acceptability: security mechanisms should not make the resource more difficult to access than if the security mechanisms were not present.
- Isolation: public access systems should be separated from critical resources (data, processes, etc.) to prevent disclosure or tampering.
- Encapsulation: the protected system can only access the data object of the system and these processes can only be invoked from a domain entry point.
- Modularity: the security mechanism must be generated as separate and protected modules and the security mechanism must be generated using the modular architecture.
- Layering: use of multiple, overlapping protection approaches addressing the people, technology, and operational aspects of information systems
- Least astonishment: should avoid surprising users (in an unpleasant way) at any cost.